

Warning Working Group Meeting IV - Friday, 27 October 1978

K1

[REDACTED]

NSA

K1

[REDACTED]

1. Major J-2 report to Shape daily; their estimate of the I&W situation.
2. 5 categories that they want reporting on.
3. They adopted the EUCOM model in their draft (green, yellow, red status degrees). Lists of objectives, but the one that was significant to this group was that there was uncertainty as to how a national J-2 was supposed to report to Shape as opposed to NATO. The fact that the economic or political indicators had gone from green to yellow and what problems that would get each J-2 involved in with his political and civilian bosses.
4. Active and inactive might make it less abrasive.
5. Let Shape take care of mechanics only.
6. Something will be going by 1 January 1979.
7. Just let Shape worry about military posture.
8. Will get draft in a week or two.
9. Will have to be presented to you (Lehman) to give to Turner or may go to NFIB.
10. Can be handled if the political/economic section is deleted and drop color indicators.

Baraz

1. Question: The international military staff gets input from Capitol, etc. Could Shape get information from NATO situation center in Brussels?

X1

[redacted]

1. No people to do any analysis work. Only 11 person staff.

Shackley

1. How do we protect ourselves against crossed wires in giving them information?
2. Washington puts Summary together and it may have something that hasn't been passed at some subordinate level and may agitate.

X1

[redacted]

1. This, plus many more pitfalls.
2. We said we wanted a 20-man team in DIA alert center consisting of a permanent group of 10 people to ensure we weren't getting our wires crossed.
3. 24-hour watch idea was dropped for a matrix.
4. The way we have it set up is DIA and EUCOM will jointly prepare this message at night and send it to them by 6:00 a.m. next morning.

Baraz

1. Part of the answer is that everybody is accustomed to living in the system.

X1

[redacted]

1. Everyone but NATO.

Shackley

1. What is the manpower level that is required to put it together at Shape? No Washington coordinated input.

X1

[REDACTED]

1. 20, 30, 40 analysts who know what is going on.

Baraz

1. May not change US requirements that much in shifting it from here to there.

X1

[REDACTED]

1. They don't have enough data over there to do the job.
2. That was the original scheme. We did feed them data 24 hours a day. That collapsed because of the manpower.

Lehman

1. What's the objective of USG?

X1

[REDACTED]

1. To ensure that when the warning situation is such that we believe NATO should be prepared to act, the process of convincing nations to act will be significantly reduced as to time.
2. The issuance of warning to NATO is hindered by the recipients of warning. They are not prepared to receive.

Lehman

1. Until they furnish us a plan, it will be very hard to focus much. Will try to get informal DCI approval.

(DCID Draft)

Lehman

1. New language suggesting clout behind manning of SWS.

(Lead-off paragraph)

(1A)

Oleson

1. In talking about warning, it will relate to possibility of military action. Not talking about avoiding surprise to President, etc., but the concept of national command authority (the President, Sec. of Def., etc.)

2. When warning is issued, how does it flow? This might ensure that it flows directly and quickly to main 2 players -- President and SecDef.

Lehman

1. Counter suggestion: "It includes the provision of strategic warning to the national command authority."

Baraz

1. It is in effect saying that strategic warning is responsibility of the national command authorities.

X1




1. You are really saying that this broad definition also includes the more narrow concept of the national command authority.

Lehman

1. That wording does not imply that the President and Defense are the only people who get strategic warning.

X1



1. The NCA's are particularly associated with the tactical warning process.

Oleson

1. They are associated with command and control.

X1

1. May fit better in Paragraph 1b. "Does not include tactical warning; however strategic warning is to be provided to the national command authorities."

Shackley

25X

Lehman

1. Something like: "To avoid surprise of the President and his advisers acting both as the National Security Council and National Command Authority..."

Oleson

1. Not terribly comfortable with that.
2. Say "avoid surprise to the National Command Authority, the NSC, etc."

Baraz

1. Why not leave it alone.

Lehman

1. Director's obligation is to the President and not to the NCA.
2. "...the President and the NSC, including the concept of the NCA."

25X1

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Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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